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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-2741 
 ___________ 
 
 ZHONG QIN HU, 
        Petitioner 
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A099-599-478) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Frederic G. Leeds 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 6, 2011 
 
 Before:  MCKEE, Chief Judge, SMITH and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: July 14, 2011) 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Zhong Hu, a citizen of China, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals‟ (“BIA”) order denying her motion to reopen.  For the reasons that follow, we 
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will deny the petition. 
I 
 Hu entered the United States in 1998 without a valid entry document.  In 2006, the 
Department of Homeland Security issued Hu a notice to appear, charging her with 
removability.  Before the IJ, Hu sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection 
under the Convention Against Torture, alleging that she feared she would be subject to 
forced sterilization and severe economic sanctions for violating China‟s one-child policy 
because she gave birth to two children in the United States.  The IJ denied relief and the 
BIA dismissed Hu‟s appeal.  Hu filed in this Court a petition for review, but the petition 
was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice.  See C.A. No. 09-3535. 
 In October 2009, while her first petition for review was pending, Hu filed a motion 
to reopen, followed by a motion to remand (which was essentially a supplement to the 
first motion), with the BIA.  Between the two filings, Hu submitted hundreds of pages of 
supporting documents, which, she asserted, establish changed circumstances in Fujian 
Province and her native Zhejiang Province, i.e., that authorities in those areas permit and 
perform forced sterilizations and that they impose severe economic sanctions on those 
who violate China‟s family planning laws.  Among the myriad documents she submitted 
were the report of Dr. Flora Sapio of the Julius-Maximilians University in Germany, 
which calls into question the validity of the State Department‟s 2007 country profile on 
asylum claims related to China (the “2007 Profile”), and Dr. Sapio‟s curriculum vitae.  
She also included a large number of documents describing the practices of family 
3 
 
planning authorities in different locations within Fujian and Zhejiang Provinces.   
 The BIA described all of the evidence Hu presented, but held that her motion to 
reopen was time-barred and that her evidence failed to demonstrate changed 
circumstances that would exempt the motion from the applicable time limitations.  The 
BIA noted that some of Hu‟s evidence had been previously submitted and that other 
evidence was not properly authenticated.  With regard to the documents describing 
various municipalities‟ family planning policies, the BIA reasoned that Hu failed to 
explain how the regulations affect her, given that the regulations were from areas other 
than Hu‟s hometown, and many were from a different province altogether.  In addition, 
some of the documents were either incomplete or had been deemed unpersuasive in prior 
BIA decisions.  Next, the BIA viewed the submission of the Sapio report as an 
unpersuasive attempt to undermine the BIA‟s decision in In re J-W-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 
185 (BIA 2007), which relied on the 2007 Profile, among other evidence, for the 
proposition that China does not forcibly sterilize Chinese nationals who return after 
having multiple children abroad.  See id. at 190-91.  The BIA also concluded that Hu 
failed to demonstrate that she would face economic harm amounting to persecution.  
Finally, the BIA declined to remand the matter for further proceedings. 
 Hu timely filed this petition for review. 
II 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252(a) to review the BIA‟s denial 
of Hu‟s motion to reopen.  We review the BIA‟s decision for an abuse of discretion.  See 
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Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d Cir. 2002).  Under that standard, we will not 
disturb the BIA‟s decision unless it was “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.”  Id.  
(quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 A motion to reopen must be filed with the BIA “within 90 days of the date of entry 
of a final administrative order of removal.”  INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(i) [8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)].  However, the 90-day limitation does not apply to a motion to 
reopen if that motion is based on “changed country conditions arising in the country of 
nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available and would not have 
been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.”  INA § 240(c)(7)(C)(ii).  
Further, a motion to reopen must establish prima facie eligibility for asylum.  See Guo v. 
Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 563 (3d Cir. 2004).  This requires “the applicant to produce 
objective evidence showing a „reasonable likelihood‟ that he can establish [that he is 
entitled to relief].”  Id. (quoting Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 175). 
 Hu raises five primary arguments in her petition for review.  First, Hu argues that 
the BIA erred in declining to consider some of her supporting documents because they 
had not been authenticated.  Official records entered into evidence “in any proceeding” 
before an Immigration Judge or the BIA must be authenticated.  8 C.F.R. § 1287.6(a), 
(b)(1), (c)(1).  In Hu‟s view, the authentication requirement of 8 C.F.R. § 1287.6 does not 
apply to motions to reopen; rather, a motion to reopen need only allege a prima facie 
case.  Only when the removal proceeding is reopened and a merits hearing is held, Hu‟s 
argument goes, is the authentication requirement triggered.  Hu‟s argument is misplaced.  
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As the Government notes, the plain language of § 1287.6 indicates that the authentication 
requirement applies “in any proceeding,” including a motion to reopen.  The BIA held 
that, although authentication need not be accomplished solely by the methods set forth in 
§ 1287.6, see Liu v. Ashcroft, 372 F.3d 529, 533 (3d Cir. 2004), Hu failed to authenticate 
the documents at issue by any means.  Hu does not dispute that the documents were not 
authenticated.  Rather, she incorrectly contends that she did not need to authenticate the 
records in this context.  We perceive no abuse of discretion by the BIA in requiring some 
effort by Hu to authenticate the records. 
 Hu‟s second argument is two-fold.  First, she argues that the BIA acted improperly 
by rejecting some of her supporting documents as incomplete or previously deemed 
unpersuasive without specifying which documents it was referring to.  As we have 
previously explained: 
[T]he „BIA abuses its discretion if it fails completely to 
address evidence of changed country circumstances offered 
by a petitioner . . . .  The BIA should demonstrate that it has 
considered such evidence, even if only to dismiss it.  In so 
doing, the BIA should provide us with more than cursory, 
summary or conclusory statements, so that we are able to 
discern its reasons for declining to afford relief to a petitioner.  
On the other hand, we do not hold . . . that where the BIA has 
given reasoned consideration to the petition, and made 
adequate findings, it must expressly parse or refute on the 
record each individual argument or piece of evidence offered 
by the petitioner . . . .  While the BIA must consider such 
evidence, it may do so in summary fashion without a 
reviewing court presuming that it has abused its discretion.‟ 
 
Zheng v. Att‟y Gen., 549 F.3d 260, 268 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Wang v. BIA, 437 F.3d 
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270, 275 (2d Cir. 2006).  We do not think the BIA ran afoul of Zheng in this instance.  
Although greater specificity with regard to which documents it considered incomplete or 
unpersuasive based on prior cases might have been helpful, the BIA‟s opinion reflects 
both that it considered the voluminous evidence before it -- albeit summarily -- and the 
reasons for its decision. 
 Relatedly, Hu suggests that the BIA‟s decision, as a whole, reflects a failure to 
adequately analyze the evidence presented.  Relying on Zheng and one of this Court‟s 
non-precedential opinions, Hu argues that the BIA simply listed the documents submitted 
without giving the documents due consideration.  We disagree with Hu‟s characterization 
of the BIA‟s opinion.  Though a mere recitation of the evidence would not suffice, the 
BIA‟s opinion reflects more.  In setting forth its list of Hu‟s numerous documents, the 
BIA first identified those documents that were previously submitted and, thus, not 
properly considered in a motion to reopen.  The second paragraph of the BIA‟s list 
identified conceivably material evidence, which, for reasons stated later in the opinion, 
was either excluded from consideration or deemed unpersuasive.  And the final portion of 
the list discusses those documents that the BIA rejected for lack of authentication.  The 
list of which Hu complains thus reflects the BIA‟s effort to organize and evaluate the 
voluminous evidence before it, not a mere regurgitation of the list of attachments in Hu‟s 
motion to reopen. 
 Next, Hu argues that the BIA violated her right to due process by requiring her to 
submit evidence of changed circumstances in a narrow geographic area while relying on 
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country reports -- particularly the 2007 Profile -- that described conditions with regard to 
China, as a whole.  To prevail on her motion to reopen, Hu had to demonstrate changed 
circumstances at either the national or relevant local level in China, see Shao v. Mukasey, 
546 F.3d 138, 163-65 (2d Cir. 2008); In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 251 (BIA 2007), 
and that she “violated [the] family planning policy as established in [her] local province, 
municipality, or other relevant area . . . .”  S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 251.  In denying the 
motion to reopen, the BIA cited its prior decisions for the proposition that, at the national 
level, China does not have a policy of forcibly sterilizing returning Chinese who had 
multiple children while out of the country.  Having failed to demonstrate a national 
policy of forced sterilization, Hu bore the burden of demonstrating that such a policy is 
enforced at the relevant local level.  The BIA appropriately questioned the relevance of 
her Fujian Province evidence, given that Hu is from Zhejiang Province.  And although 
Hu presented evidence regarding practices in Zhejiang Province, that evidence was not 
authenticated, so the BIA acted within its discretion in rejecting that evidence.  Thus, Hu 
has not shown that the BIA acted arbitrarily, irrationally, or contrary to the law. 
 Fourth, Hu argues that the BIA rejected Dr. Sapio‟s critique of the 2007 Profile 
without providing a reason for doing so.  This is yet another claim that the BIA did not 
give due consideration to the evidence before it, in violation of the rule we announced in 
Zheng.  Like Hu‟s other such claims, this argument lacks merit.  The BIA is permitted to 
credit the State Department reports in rendering decisions.  Cf. Ambartsoumian v. 
Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[W]e have held that State Department reports 
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may constitute „substantial evidence‟ for the purposes of reviewing immigration 
decisions.”); Lal v. INS, 255 F.3d 998, 1023 (9th Cir. 2001) (describing State Department 
country reports as the “most appropriate” and “perhaps best resource” on country 
conditions).  The opinion in this case demonstrates that the BIA considered the 
continuing relevance of the 2007 Profile in light of Dr. Sapio‟s report, but concluded that 
the report alone was insufficient to undermine the Profile, especially given that the State 
Department had not indicated any change in its view of the Profile‟s conclusions.  In 
short, the BIA weighed competing views and reasoned that Dr. Sapio‟s report was less 
compelling.  That is all that Zheng requires. 
 Finally, Hu takes issue with the BIA‟s determination that reopening was not 
warranted based on her claim that she will be subjected to persecutive fines.  The BIA 
held that:  “[Hu] has not shown that she would be subjected to economic harm amounting 
to persecution . . . .  She has not met the requirements of Section 240(c)(7)(C)(ii) of the 
[INA].”  Read together, these statements evince the BIA‟s determination that Hu failed to 
satisfy her burden of demonstrating that she was entitled to reopening based on changed 
conditions in China regarding fines imposed on those who violate the one-child law.  The 
BIA‟s decision was not an abuse of discretion, given that the only evidence Hu cited in 
support of her argument was a Zhejiang Province law that has been in force since 2002. 
 To the extent that the BIA also considered whether Hu made out a prima facie 
case of economic persecution, as required to warrant reopening, we read the BIA‟s 
opinion to hold that Hu provided insufficient evidence of her financial circumstances to 
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permit the conclusion that any fines she may face would amount to persecution.  Because 
such evidence is required to assess the impact of economic sanctions, see In re T-Z-, 24 
I. & N. Dec. 163, 174-75 (BIA 2007); cf. Guan Shan Liao v. U.S. Dep‟t of Justice, 293 
F.3d 61, 69-70 (2d Cir. 2002) (petitioner failed to demonstrate that fines imposed on him 
amounted to past economic persecution because he introduced no evidence about his 
income, net worth, or other financial circumstances at the time the fines were imposed), 
yet Hu failed to include any information about her financial circumstances in her motion 
to reopen, we agree with the BIA‟s assessment.1 
 Because Hu has not shown that the BIA abused its discretion in denying her 
motion to reopen, we will deny the petition for review. 
                                                 
1
  Relatedly, we note that Hu unsuccessfully raised an economic persecution claim in 
her asylum application, and her petition for review of that decision was voluntarily 
dismissed with prejudice. 
